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ABSTRACT
Fake news gains has gained significant momentum, strongly
motivating the need for fake news research. Many fake news
detection approaches have thus been proposed, where most
of them heavily rely on news content. However, network-
based clues revealed when analyzing news propagation on
social networks is an information that has hardly been com-
prehensively explored or used for fake news detection. We
bridge this gap by proposing a network-based pattern-driven
fake news detection approach. We aim to study the patterns
of fake news in social networks, which refer to the news being
spread, spreaders of the news and relationships among the
spreaders. Empirical evidence and interpretations on the
existence of such patterns are provided based on social psy-
chological theories. These patterns are then represented at
various network levels (i.e., node-level, ego-level, triad-level,
community-level and the overall network) for being further
utilized to detect fake news. The proposed approach en-
hances the explainability in fake news feature engineering.
Experiments conducted on real-world data demonstrate that
the proposed approach can outperform the state of the arts.
1. INTRODUCTION
With “post-truth” named as the Word of the Year in 2016
by the Oxford Dictionary, discussion around fake news has
sparked, especially in the period around the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential election and the U.K. Brexit referendum [44]. The
rise of social media and its popularity play an indispensable
role in this surge of interest. Social media breaks the phys-
ical distance barrier among individuals, and provides rich
platforms for users to participate and discuss online news,
where the most popular story during the critical months of
the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign (“Pope Fran-
cis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President,
Releases Statement”, which was fake news) can generate
960,000 shares, reactions, and comments on Facebook [34].
The situation becomes worse with the existence of an echo
chamber effect on social media, where the biased informa-
tion can be amplified and reinforced [10]. Meanwhile, stud-
ies have shown that humans can be irrational and vulnerable
differentiating between truth and falsehood when overloaded
with deceptive information; studies in social psychology and
communications have demonstrated that human ability to
detect deception is only slightly better than chance - with a
mean accuracy of 54% over 1,000 participants in over 100 ex-
periments [27]. Various manual fact-checking websites and
platforms (e.g., PolitiFact1and Snopes2) have emerged to
serve the public on this matter. Nevertheless, manual fact-
checking does not scale well with the volume of newly cre-
ated information, especially on social media, hence motivat-
ing the need for automatic fake news detection.
Current research on automatic fake news detection heavily
relies on news content [22]. These studies have significantly
contributed to fake news detection (see “Related Work” in
Section 2) while often face multiple challenges.
First, the traditional approach to detect fake news is to use
a knowledge-based fact-checking system [5; 32]. The system
compares relational knowledge extracted from to-be-verified
news content with that stored in a knowledge graph, often a
ground truth dataset collected from the Web [6; 25]. How-
ever, the most serious issue by using such system is that it
can only detect false news instead of fake news (i.e., inten-
tionally false news) [41]. Second, another common approach
is to use a style-based fake news detection system by assum-
ing that fake news exhibits a distinguishable writing style
from that of the truth [43], where malicious entities can
disguise the writing style to bypass these linguistic mod-
els. Recently, neural networks and deep learning techniques
have been well developed to detect fake news by incorporat-
ing multi-modal or social-network data, e.g., images within
news content [37; 40] and users (news spreaders) [15; 29;
42]; nevertheless, these models often face the problems with
computational efficiency or interpretability [44].
Present Work: Considering that social-network data re-
lated to news propagation and spreaders has hardly been
comprehensively explored (across network levels) and used
in an explainable way for fake news detection, we propose
a network-based pattern-driven fake news detection model,
robust against manipulations by malicious entities on news
content. To that end, our work aims to utilize patterns in
fake news dissemination on social networks, which reveal
that compared to the truth, fake news can (i) spread farther
and (ii) attract more spreaders, where these spreaders are of-
ten (iii) more strongly engaged with the news and (iv) more
densely connected within the network. Machine learning
features representing these patterns are designed at differ-
ent levels of a network (i.e., node-, ego-, triad-, community-,
and network-level), which will be further used within a su-
pervised learning framework to detect fake news. Overall,
the specific contributions of this paper are as follows:
1https://www.politifact.com/
2https://www.snopes.com/
1. A network-based pattern-driven approach is proposed,
which can detect fake news in an explainable way. Exper-
iments conducted on real-world data demonstrate that
the proposed approach can perform comparatively well
compared to the state of the art.
2. Fake news patterns in social networks are investigated
and summarized, which relate to the news being spread,
spreaders of the news, and relationships among the news
spreaders. Empirical studies and social psychological
theories are provided to validate and interpret the ex-
istence of these patterns;
3. Fake news patterns are represented and quantified across
multiple network levels, i.e., node, ego, triad, commu-
nity, and the overall network level. Experimental results
indicate that the proposed approach can perform stably
with limited available network information, which makes
it suitable for fake news early detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews current fake news detection research. Fake news
patterns in social networks are summarized and represented
in Section 3. Experiments are conducted and presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
As an emerging topic, the development of fake news detec-
tion is in its early stages, where the existing research can
be generally grouped into content-based and network-based
fake news detection.
Content-based Fake News Detection. Content-based
fake news detection investigates news content. One tradi-
tional way of detection is based on knowledge, often repre-
sented as a set of (Subject, Predicate, Object) triples [6;
21]. Knowledge-based approaches aim to assess news au-
thenticity by comparing the knowledge extracted from to-
be-verified news content with true knowledge (i.e., ground
truth) [5; 32]. Such ground truth is generally provided in a
knowledge graph such as Knowledge Vault [6], which con-
tains massive manually processed relational knowledge from
the open Web. However, the timeliness and completeness
of knowledge graphs are still open issues, and importantly,
such approaches developed can only detect false news rather
than fake news (intentionally false news) [44].
Another common way is based on writing style, a set of self-
defined [non-latent] features well representing news writing
style. Style features can be those capturing content struc-
ture at various language levels such as discourse level by
employing rhetorical structure theory [28; 12]; or those cap-
turing specific attributes in the content such as sentiment
and readability [24; 23; 43], which can be supported by
forensic psychological theories such as Undeutsch hypothesis
[35]. Such fundamental theories are a double-edged sword
for content-based fake news detection: features inspired can
help achieve explainable fake news detection, while some
linguistic cues that they reveal might not be applicable for
news articles (e.g, non-immediacy) [44].
In addition to non-latent features, fake news detection based
on latent representation of news content has been well devel-
oped recently, where neural networks such as Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) [37] have been utilized to automat-
ically select content features. Nevertheless, these features
are often difficult to be comprehended.
While content-based approaches can detect fake news by
analyzing news content from various perspectives, auxiliary
information revealed in news propagation, e.g., news spread-
ers, is not considered. In addition, approaches can be sensi-
tive to news content when heavily relying on it, where ma-
licious entities might manipulate the results of detection by
disguising their writing styles. Hence, network-based fake
news detection has been emerged recently.
Network-based Fake News Detection. Network-based
fake news detection utilizes social context information re-
vealed in news propagation. In general, it investigates two
types of networks: homogeneous and heterogeneous networks.
Homogeneous networks contain single type of nodes and
edges. A typical example is the stance network, which rep-
resents the stance (e.g., for or against) similarity among
news or posts of news. Based on such network, Jin et al.
evaluate news credibility by mining the stance correlations
within a graph optimization framework [11]. Another typ-
ical example of homogeneous networks is the propagation
graph (tree), which presents post-repost relationships for
each news article on social media, e.g., tweets and retweets
on Twitter [38; 17]. Using propagation trees, for instance,
Vosoughi et al. discover that fake news spreads faster, far-
ther and more broadly than the truth [36].
Heterogeneous networks have multiple types of nodes or
edges. By exploring relationships among entities such as
news articles, publishers, users (spreaders) and user posts,
PageRank-like algorithm [7], matrix/tensor factorization [8;
33], and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) [29; 42] have
been developed for fake news detection.
In general, our work is a complement of the current [network-
based] studies. Compared to current studies, our work in-
vestigates a homogeneous network, the friendship network.
To our best knowledge, studying fake news with respect to
the friendship network is yet to be explored, which allows
one to better understand news spreaders and their social re-
lationships on various network levels. Additionally, we aim
to detect fake news in an explainable way - by utilizing its
propagation characteristics on social networks, which will be
detailed in the next section.
3. FAKE NEWS PATTERNS AND REPRE-
SENTATION IN NETWORKS
Fake news dissemination in networks exhibits distinguish-
able patterns from the diffusion of true news. In this section,
we summarize these patterns and discuss social psychologi-
cal theories that can explain the existence of these patterns.
In terms of fake news patterns, we demonstrate ways to rep-
resent news articles as a set of features across network levels
(i.e., node-, triad-, community- and network-level), which
can be further utilized to detect fake news within a super-
vised machine learning framework.
Broadly speaking, fake news patterns involved in this study
relate to (1) the news being spread (Section 3.1 and Sec-
tion 3.2), (2) spreaders of the news (Section 3.3), and (3)
relationships among the news spreaders (Section 3.4). Be-
fore further elaboration, we first define Fake News Network
(FNN) in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Fake News Network, FNN). Fake
News Network (FNN) is a subgraph GF = (VF ,EF ) of the
social network G = (V,E), where VF ∈ V are the users that
Table 1: Key Notations
Notation Description
F ; T Fake news events; True news events
G = (V,E) Social (friendship) network
GX = (VX ,EX) X = F : Fake news network; X = T : True news network
ENS Relationships from a normal user to a susceptible user
E△>0; E△=0; E△<0 Relationships satisfying S(vi)− S(vj) > 0;S(vi)− S(vj) = 0;S(vi)− S(vj) < 0
VX ; TrX ; MX Nodes (Spreaders); Triads; Communities within GX
B(∗) B = 1 if ∗ is true; otherwise, B = 0
C(v) Influence (centrality) of user v
S(v) Susceptibility of user v
θ Threshold of user susceptibility, S(v) < θ (S(v) > θ) indicates a normal (susceptible) user
T(v,X) Spreading frequency of user v for news event X
have engaged with fake news F, and EF ∈ E represents the
relationships among these users.
True News Network (TNN) is similarly defined, which is
denoted as GT = (VT ,ET ) for a true news event T . The
key notations in this section are presented in Table 1.
3.1 More-Spreader Pattern
Evidence has been provided that fake news is in general
more “popular” than true news within the same population
of users. For instance, during the critical months of the 2016
U.S. presidential election campaign, top twenty frequently-
discussed fake election stories generated 8,711,000 shares,
reactions, and comments on Facebook, ironically, greater
than the total of 7,367,000 for the top twenty most-discussed
election stories posted by nineteen major news medium [34].
Fake news popularity can be attributed to two reasons. First,
as stated by information gap theory [16], rather than telling
the truth, fake news creators make great efforts to produce
an information gap between the news content and individu-
als’ knowledge. Such information gap produces the feeling of
deprivation labeled curiosity, which motivates individuals to
obtain the missing information to reduce such feeling. Sec-
ondly, to greatly influence online users, those who can bene-
fit from fake news often create or recruit malicious accounts
(e.g., bots [30]) to spread or discuss the fake content. For
example, millions of malicious accounts have participated in
2016 U.S. presidential election online discussions.3
News popularity can be characterized in terms of the number
of users that spread such news, where Vosoughi et al. [36]
have empirically validated that:
Pattern 1 (More-Spreader Pattern). More users
spread fake news than true news.
To capture the number of news spreaders, we investigate the
number and proportion of (I) general (i.e., non-attributed)
spreaders and (II) specific (i.e., attributed) spreaders in news
propagation.
I. General (Non-Attributed) Spreaders. In general,
the More-Spreaders Pattern can be quantified by the
number of users involved in spreading each fake or true news
story. This number is basically the number of nodes within
each FNN and TNN, which we use as a feature.
3https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/public-
scholarship/resource-for-understanding-political-bots/
II. Specific (Attributed) Spreaders. Principles like ho-
mophily [18] and social validation theory [4] suggest that in a
social network, users with similar characteristics tend to be-
come connected or form groups and exhibit similar behavior.
These observations imply that spreaders of fake (true) news
stories may also share some similar attributes; hence, allow-
ing one to distinguish fake news from true news by studying
specific users (i.e., with specific attributes) participated in
news dissemination. Here we consider (a) user susceptibil-
ity [to fake news] and (b) user influence, both of which are
attributes that can be computed with information provided
by FNNs and TNNs.
a. User Susceptibility. We investigate user susceptibility to
fake news based on (i) the number of involvements in the
propagation of different fake news and (ii) the frequency of
such involvements.
i. Number of Involvements. Susceptibility in terms of in-
volvements is defined as the proportion of fake news
among all news that user vi has participated in spread-
ing, which is denoted as S(vi):
S(vi) =
∑
j
B(vi ∈ VFj )∑
k
B(vi ∈ VTk ) +
∑
j
B(vi ∈ VFj )
, (1)
where B(vi ∈ VX) = 1 if vi ∈ VX , otherwise B(vi ∈
VX) = 0. S(vi) = 1 (S(vi) = 0) indicates that all news
stories spread through vi are fake (true), i.e., vi is com-
pletely susceptible (immune) to fake news.
ii. Frequency of Involvements. Consider the special case
where a user spreads a true news story once and a fake
news story multiple times, this user may need to be con-
sidered more susceptible than a user who posts each
story once. Hence, as an alternative way, we define
user susceptibility as the ratio between the spreading fre-
quency of fake news stories and that of all news stories
a user has spread. Mathematically,
S(vi) =
∑
j B(vi ∈ VFj )T(vi,Fj)
∑
k B(vi ∈ VTk )T(vi,Tk) +
∑
j B(vi ∈ VFj )T(vi,Fj)
,
(2)
whereT(vi, X) is the number of times that vi has spread
news story X.
Being assigned with a susceptibility score S(vi), users can
be further labeled as susceptible (S(vi) > θ) or normal
(S(vi) < θ) based on a fixed threshold value θ ∈ [0, 1]. Such
labeling allows us to represent More-Spreaders Pattern
by recording the (i) number and (ii) proportion of suscepti-
ble spreaders (nodes) in each FNN or TNN, as well as the
(iii) number and (iv) proportion of normal spreaders within
each FNN and TNN. We include (i-iv) as features represent-
ing the pattern. Without such labeling one can represent
spreaders involved in each FNN or TNN in terms of their
mean and median of susceptibility scores, which are also
considered into our feature set.
b. User Influence. An approximation of a node (user) in-
fluence can be computed via a centrality score within the
network. One can consider the following well-established
criteria for computing centrality: (i) [in-, out-] degrees, (ii)
[in-, out-] closeness, (iii) betweenness, (iv) PageRank score,
(v) hub and authority score, all of which use the connections
among nodes to identify their positions within the network.
We avoid grouping users into influential and non-influential
users as many parameters will be introduced (each central-
ity measure requires a threshold value), which in turn can
affect the performance of fake news detection. Therefore,
based on each centrality measure, we directly calculate the
mean and median user influence within each FNN and TNN,
and include both as features.
3.2 Farther-Distance Pattern
In addition to the number of users that spread news articles,
news popularity can be also characterized by how far the
news can spread, which leads to the corresponding pattern:
Pattern 2 (Farther-Distance Pattern). Fake news
spreads farther than true news.
This pattern has been observed and validated by Vosoughi
et al. [36]; they found that the propagation trees of fake news
are generally deeper than that of truth, i.e., an original post
referring to a fake news event is often more iteratively for-
warded than a true news event. On the other hand, given a
news story, how far it spreads can be approximated by com-
puting the shortest “distance” between the two most distant
spreaders (nodes) within the corresponding FNN or TNN
(i.e., network diameter). To represent Farther-Distance
Pattern and calculate such “distance”, we investigate (I)
shortest (geodesic) distance which refers to the paths ex-
isting between two nodes, and (II) effective distance which
considers the information flow between two nodes [2].
I. Geodesic Distance. Based on geodesic distance, the
diameter of each FNN and TNN is equivalent to the shortest
path length between the two most distant spreaders within
the network.
II. Effective Distance. Besides conventional shortest dis-
tance, we introduce effective distance to help assess the net-
work diameter, which was initially proposed by Brockmann
and Helbing [2]. The initial binary (unweighted) FNNs and
TNNs is hence transformed into weighted networks, where
the weights are determined by the volume of information
flow among nodes. Given a network, the effective distance
among nodes is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Effective Distance). Given a network
G, we assume F denotes the flow matrix whose entities Fij
represent the volume of information flow from node i to node
j. Based on the flow matrix, the effective distance dEff(i, j)
from node i to node j is defined as
dEff(i, j) = 1− log
Fij∑
l
Flj
, (3)
where dEff(i, j) satisfies dEff(i,j) ≥ 1.
Information flow has been defined differently in various net-
works. For instance, it can be the passenger flux in global
mobility networks or the transport flow in transportation
networks [2]. In FNNs and TNNs it is the news flow among
nodes (users) in the network which can be defined as (i) the
total number of news stories both users have spread, i.e.,
Fij =
∑
X
B(eij ∈ EX), or (ii) the overall number of times
both users have at least spread the same news stories, i.e.,
Fij =
∑
X
B(eij ∈ EX)×min{T(ui, X),T(uj , X)}. The di-
ameter of each FNN and TNN based on effective distance is
then equivalent to the minimum [sum of] effective distance
between the two most distant spreaders within the network.
We include diameters computed using geodesic and effec-
tive distances as features representing Farther-Distance
Pattern.
3.3 Stronger-Engagement Pattern
The statistics in [34] have revealed that fake news stories can
engage users more compared to true news stories. Note that
a user may decide to engage with a fake news story (e.g., post
it) more than one time, such “more engagements” can be
attributed to the number of users engaging with fake news,
which has been summarized as More-Spreader Pattern
investigated in Section 3.1, and/or to the number of times
each user engages with a fake news story, leading to the
following pattern:
Pattern 3 (Stronger-Engagement Pattern).
Spreaders engage more strongly with fake news than with
true news.
To quantify the “engagements” of users for each news story,
one can concentrate on (I) group level engagements, i.e.,
the engagements of all spreaders, and (II) individual level
engagements, i.e., the engagements of a single spreader.
I. Group Engagements. On a group level, quantifying
spreader engagements for a certain news story can be equiv-
alent to counting the total number of times that the news
story has been spread. With specific user attributes (suscep-
tible or normal), such engagements can be further quantified
as the (i) number or (ii) proportion of times that the news
story has been spread by susceptible users, as well as (iii)
number or (iv) proportion of times that the news story has
been spread by normal users.
II. Individual Engagements. Individual engagements of
a news story can be evaluated by the average spreading fre-
quencies of (susceptible, normal, all) users who have partic-
ipated in the news propagation. In this case, the impact of
the number of such news spreaders (i.e., More-Spreaders
Pattern) is divided and removed.
All above ways of representing fake news patterns are on the
level of nodes, e.g., individual engagement, and the whole
network, e.g., network diameter. Next we will specify how
to represent Denser-Networks Pattern for fake news de-
tection, which will be represented at different network levels:
ego, triad and community.
3.4 Denser-Network Pattern
Research in social psychology such as homophily [18] and
social validation theory [4] suggests that connected users in
social networks share similar attributes, interests and behav-
iors, e.g., sharing the same news article. On the other hand,
malicious users often form cohesive groups, taking collective
action that are more purposeful than normal users [20; 39].
These fundamental theories suggest the possibility to as-
sume that fake and true news articles can be distinguished
by the relationships among their corresponding spreaders,
which can be summarized as:
Pattern 4 (Denser-Network Pattern). Fake news
spreaders form denser networks compared to truth spreaders.
To capture the “density” of connections among news spread-
ers, we analyze news networks at different levels: (I) ego,
(II) triad and (III) community levels.
I. Ego Level. At the ego level, to compute density of net-
works formed by users that have engaged with a certain news
story, we look at the numbers and proportions of connections
that these users (spreaders) have (i) generally formed with
other spreaders, and (ii) specifically with other normal or
susceptible spreaders.
i. General Ego Relations. We include as a feature the to-
tal number of ego relationships among spreaders for each
news story, i.e., the number of edges within each FNN and
TNN (|EX |). To eliminate the impact of the number of news
spreaders (i.e., More-Spreaders Pattern), for each FNN
or TNN GX we also record |EX |/|VX | and |EX |/
(
|VX |
2
)
,
which calculate the average number of ego relationships per
spreader and network density, respectively. Here, |VX | is
the number of spreaders (nodes) in GX and
(
|VX |
2
)
is the
number of edges within a fully connected version of GX .
ii. Specific Ego Relations. Labeling users as susceptible or
normal allows one to group all directed ego relationships into
four subsets: (1) ENN containing relationships from a nor-
mal user to a normal user, (2) ENS containing relationships
from a normal user to a susceptible one, (3) ESN contain-
ing relationships from a susceptible user to a normal one,
(4) ESS containing relationships from a susceptible user to
a susceptible one. We include the number and proportion of
each type of edges within a FNN or TNN as features being
used for fake news detection. In addition, each edge eij can
be also classified into one of the following set: (1) E△>0 if
△ = S(vi) − S(vj) > 0, (2) E△=0 if S(vi) − S(vj) = 0, (3)
E△<0 if S(vi)−S(vj) < 0 which does not require partition-
ing users into susceptible or normal ones. We also include
as features the number and proportion of each above type
of edges within a FNN or TNN.
II. Triad Level. Triads (a set of three connected users)
are the most basic subgraphs of networks. Similar to our
study at the ego level, we investigate (i) general triads and
(ii) specific triads formed between [susceptible and normal]
users within networks.
i. General Triads. One simple way to represent theDenser-
Network pattern is to directly count the total number of
triads |TrX | within a GX . Similarly, to control for More-
Spreaders Pattern, we also include as features the value
of |TrX |/|VX | and |TrX |/
(
|VX |
3
)
where
(
|VX |
3
)
is the number
of triads within a fully connected version of GX .
Figure 1: Specific Triads. N indicates normal users and S
indicates susceptible users. A→ B denotes A follows B.
ii. Specific Triads. Regarding each user as either a sus-
ceptible or normal user, we can have twelve different triads
to be further explored (shown in Figure 1). We include as
features the number and proportion of every type of triads
within each FNN and TNN.
III. Community Level. In networks, a community struc-
ture refers to the occurrence of groups of nodes in a network
that are more densely connected internally than with the
rest of the network. Therefore, the number and proportion
of communities within each FNN and TNN can be used to
representDenser-Networks Pattern and, broadly speak-
ing, should be negatively correlated to the network density.
As features, we include the number of communities |MX |
within each FNN and TNN, and the proportion of commu-
nities (assuming in the worst case each node is its own com-
munity) which removes the impact of the number of news
spreaders, i.e., the value of |MX |/|VX |. Note that |MX | can
be obtained either from (i) global or (ii) local perspective.
From a global perspective, communities that nodes (spread-
ers) belong to within a FNN or TNN, as a subgraph of the
social network, are based on the structure of the overall so-
cial network. From a local perspective, communities can
be detected within a FNN or TNN. We include counts and
proportion features for both types of communities.
Integrated Representation of Patterns. To represent
each fake news pattern, we have used network information
such as network diameters, the number of news spreaders
(size), and the number of relationships among the spreaders
(density). Networks with various diameters, sizes and den-
sities exhibit various overall structures. Hence, the overall
network structure can be regarded as the integrated repre-
sentation of all related patterns. On the other hand, in-
cluding such “structure” features to detect fake news helps
to evaluate if the fake news patterns and their representa-
tions defined in this section have well captured the differ-
ence of dissemination between fake news and the truth. To
quantify such “structure”, one can compare the similarities
among FNNs and TNNs, where graph kernel and graph em-
bedding [31; 38] methods can be useful. Here, we consider
FNNs and TNNs as labeled graphs for further comparison,
where node labels can be either (i) user identities or (ii) user
attributes (susceptible or normal).
Overall, Table 2 presents all features defined and involved
in our work to detect fake news, and their corresponding
formulations for reproducibility.
Table 2: Network-based Pattern-driven Feature Set for Fake News Detection
Pattern No. Feature(s) Formulation(s)
M
o
r
e
-
S
p
r
e
a
d
e
r
s
P
a
t
t
e
r
n
1 # News Spreaders |VX |
2-9
# Normal Spreaders, where user susceptibility, a.k.a., S(v), is based on Equa-
tion (1) (#news) or Equation (2) (frequency)
|
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj) ≤ θ)|
# Susceptible Spreaders, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency |
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj) ≥ θ)|
% Normal Spreaders, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
|
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj )≤θ)|
|VX |
% Susceptible Spreaders, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
|
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj )≥θ)|
|VX |
10-13
Average Spreader Susceptibility, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX
S(vj)
|VX |
Median Spreader Susceptibility, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
P(S(vj) ≤ MSS) = 0.5
for vj ∈ VX
14-29
Average Spreader Influence, where influence is based on (in-, out-) degree, (in-,
out-) closeness, betweenness, PageRank score, hub and authority score
∑
vj∈VX
C(vj )
|VX |
Median Spreader Influence, where influence is based on (in-, out-) degree, (in-,
out-) closeness, betweenness, PageRank score, hub and authority score
P(C(vj) ≤ MSI) = 0.5
for vj ∈ VX
F
a
r
t
h
e
r
-
D
is
t
a
n
c
e
P
a
t
t
e
r
n 30-32 Maximum, Average, and Median Geodesic Distance -
33-38
Maximum, Average, and Median Effective Distance, information flow is based
on #news and frequency See Definition 2
S
t
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-
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e
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e
n
t
P
a
t
t
e
r
n
39 # User Engagements
∑
vj∈VX
T(vj , X)
40-47
# Normal User Engagements, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≤θ
T(vj , X)
# Susceptible User Engagements, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≥θ
T(vj , X)
% Normal User Engagements, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≤θ
T(vj,X)
∑
vj∈VX
T(vj,X)
% Susceptible User Engagements, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≥θ
T(vj,X)
∑
vj∈VX
T(vj,X)
48 Average User Engagements
∑
vj∈VX
T(vj,X)
|VX |
49-52
Avg. Normal User Engagements, where S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≤θ
T(vj,X)
|
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj )≤θ)|
Avg. Susceptible User Engagements, S(v) is based on #news or frequency
∑
vj∈VX ;S(vj)≥θ
T(vj,X)
|
∑
vj∈VX
B(S(vj )≥θ)|
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53 # Relationships among Spreaders |EX |
54 Average # Relationships of Spreaders |EX |/|VX |
55 Ego Density |EX |/
(
|VX |
2
)
56-71
#/% N → N , where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |ENN ∩ EX |;
|ENN∩EX |
|EX |
#/% N → S, where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |ENS ∩ EX |;
|ENS∩EX |
|EX |
#/% S → N , where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |ESN ∩ EX |;
|ESN∩EX |
|EX |
#/% S → S, where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |ESS ∩ EX |;
|ESS∩EX |
|EX |
72-83
#/% S(vi) > S(vj), where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |E△>0 ∩ EX |;
|E△>0∩EX |
|EX |
#/% S(vi) = S(vj), where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |E△=0 ∩ EX |;
|E△=0∩EX |
|EX |
#/% S(vi) < S(vj), where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |E△<0 ∩ EX |;
|E△<0∩EX |
|EX |
84 # Triads |TrX |
85 Average # Triads of Spreaders |TrX |/|VX |
86 Triad Density |TrX |/
(
|VX |
3
)
87-110 # Tr1 to Tr12 (see Figure 1), where S(v) is based on #news and frequency |Trk ∩ TrX |;
|Trk∩TrX |
|TrX |
;
k = 1, 2, · · · , 12111-134 % Tr1 to Tr12, where user susceptibility is based on # news and frequency
135-136 # Communities (from global and local perspective, see Section 3.4 for details) |MX |
137-138 Community Density (from global and local perspective) |MX |/|VX |
Table 3: Data Statistics
Data PolitiFact BuzzFeed
# Users 23,865 15,257
# News–Users 32,791 22,779
# Users–Users 574,744 634,750
# News Stories 240 182
# True News 120 91
# Fake News 120 91
# Triads 6,972,189 6,885,951
# Communities 163 46
4. EXPERIMENTS
Fake news patterns in networks have been specified as well
as how they can be represented as a set of quantifiable and
meaningful features. In this section, various experiments
are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed ap-
proach in detecting fake news. We first present the experi-
mental setup in Section 4.1, followed by the evaluations of
experimental results in Section 4.2.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We detail data used in experiments in Section 4.1.1, fol-
lowed by how data is prepared for experiments in Section
4.1.2, and the baselines which the proposed approach is
compared with in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Datasets
Our experiments are conducted on two public benchmark
datasets of fake news detection [33]. News articles in these
datasets are collected from PolitiFact and BuzzFeed, respec-
tively. Ground truth labels (true or fake) of news articles
in both datasets are provided by fact-checking experts. In
addition to (i) news content and labels, both datasets also
provide information on (ii) social network of Twitter which
contains Twitter users and their following relationships, i.e.,
user-user relationships, and (iii) how the news has prop-
agated (tweeted/re-tweeted) by users, i.e., news-user rela-
tionships. Based on the original datasets, we further iden-
tify triads and communities in the social network. Com-
munities are detected using Louvain algorithm, a fast and
widely-accepted modularity-based community detection al-
gorithm [1]. Statistics of two datasets are shown in Table 3.
4.1.2 Data Preparation
Following dataset collection, feature values are computed for
both datasets, which will be utilized in a supervised learn-
ing framework for fake news detection. However, an extra
step is necessary to take when computing user susceptibility
scores. In Section 3, two ways are defined for determining
user susceptibility [to fake news] (see Equation (1) and (2),
respectively). Both ways rely on the historical information
of users on how they previously engaged in fake news dissem-
ination, where the news labels (true or fake) are necessary in
the calculation. To avoid information leakage (i.e., features
having an unfair prior knowledge of labels), when dividing
a dataset into the training and testing one, we dynamically
calculate user susceptibility by using the historical infor-
mation provided in training dataset, rather than the whole
dataset. For users with no historical information in training
dataset, we treat their susceptibility as the threshold value,
indicating that their susceptibility to fake news is unknown.
4.1.3 Baselines
The performance of the proposed method is compared with
several benchmark fake news detection methods on the same
datasets. These methods include (1) content-based (linguis-
tic) models, which rely on non-latent ([23; 43]) or latent
representation ([19; 14]) of news content, (2) network-based
models ([3]), which investigate information revealed in news
propagation, and hybrid models ([33]), which utilize both
content and network information to detect fake news.
I. Pe´rez-Rosas et al. [23] propose a comprehensive lin-
guistic model for fake news detection, involving the following
features: (i) n-grams (i.e., uni-grams and bi-grams) and (ii)
CFGs based on TF-IDF encoding; (iii) word and phrase pro-
portions referring to all categories provided by LIWC; and
(iv) readability. Features are computed and used to predict
fake news within a supervised machine learning framework.
II. Zhou et al. [43]. In our previous study, forensic psy-
chological theories are studied and used to detect fake news
in a supervised learning framework, which provide the evi-
dence of distinguishing fake news in content style from the
truth. Such content style is captured by the frequency of
(i) lexicons relying on Bag-Of-Words (BOW) model, (ii)
Part-Of-Speech (POS) tags and Context Free Grammers
(CFGs) at syntax-level, (iii) Rhetorical Relationships (RRs)
at discourse-level, and by assessing a set of theory-driven (iv)
DisInformation-related Attributes (DIAs) and (v) ClickBait-
related Attributes (CBAs) at semantic-level.
III. Castillo et al. [3] design features that exploit infor-
mation from user profiles, tweets and propagation trees to
evaluate news credibility within a supervised learning frame-
work. Specifically, these features are based on (i) quantity,
sentiment, hash-tag and URL information from user tweets,
(ii) user profiles such as registration age, (iii) news topics
through mining tweets of users, and (iv) propagation trees
(e.g., the number of propagation trees for each news topic).
IV. Shu et al. [33] detect fake news by exploring and em-
bedding the relationships among news articles, publishers
and spreaders on social media. Such embedding involves
(i) news content by using non-negative matrix factorization,
(ii) users on social media, (iii) news-user relationships (i.e.,
user engagements in spreading news articles), and (iv) news-
publisher relationships (i.e., publisher engagements in pub-
lishing news articles). Fake news detection is then conducted
within a semi-supervised machine learning framework.
Additionally, fake news detection based on latent represen-
tation of news articles is also investigated in comparative
studies, where we consider as baselines supervised classi-
fiers with features being (V) Word2Vec [19] and (VI)
Doc2Vec [14] embedding of news articles.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
Various supervised learners with 5-fold cross-validation were
used in our experiments. The performance is evaluated us-
ing accuracy and F1 score. In the following, we will first
present the general performance of the proposed approach
in Section 4.2.1. Based on that, the importance of patterns
(see Section 4.2.2) and features (see Section 4.2.3) in fake
news detection is further assessed. The sensitivity of the
proposed approach is evaluated to the threshold and calcu-
lation of user susceptibility in Section 4.2.4, as well as its
sensitivity to how much labeled news articles are available
Figure 2: General Performance of Fake News Detection by
Using Different Classifiers, where random forests perform
best among all on both datasets.
and what proportion between two labels (true vs. fake) in
Section 4.2.5. The performance of our approach on fake
news early detection is finally examined in Section 4.2.6.
4.2.1 General Performance Evaluation
We experimented with various classifiers to detect fake news
using our features, including Support Vector Machine (SVM),
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), Na¨ıve Bayes (NB), Decision
Trees (DT) and Random Forests (RF). The results obtained
are all provided in Figure 2. It can be observed from the
Figure 2 that RF performs best on both datasets, achieving
an accuracy and F1 score of around 0.93 on PolitiFact and
around 0.84 on BuzzFeed.
Such performance is further compared with that of baselines,
where the results are presented in Table 4. Compared to the
content-based ([23; 43; 19; 14]) and network-based models
([3]) among baselines, the proposed approach can perform
relatively well on both datasets. Compared to the hybrid
one ([33]), the proposed approach can be comparable with
it and can outperform it when introducing the linguistic
features in the proposed approach (“Our Approach + [43]”).
4.2.2 Performance of Fake News Patterns
We further analyze the performance of each fake news pat-
tern and their combinations on fake news detection. The
results are presented in Table 5, which supports the fol-
lowing observations. First, More-Spreader Pattern and
Stronger-Engagement Pattern perform best compared
to the others when being separately utilized to detect fake
news, achieving around 89% (81%) accuracy and F1 score us-
ing PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data. The performance of Denser-
Network Pattern follows. Second, when combining dif-
ferent patterns, their performance is in general better than
when separately using them, which can achieve an accuracy
and F1 score of around 93% (82%) on PolitiFact (BuzzFeed).
Third, when using all patterns to detect fake news, a signif-
icantly better performance is achieved compared to using
network similarity, which provides a mix of patterns from a
Table 4: General Performance of Fake News Detection
Methods. The proposed network-based approach can per-
form relatively well compared to the content-based ([23; 43;
19; 14]) and network-based approaches ([3]) among base-
lines. Compared to the hybrid one ([33]), the proposed ap-
proach can be comparable with it and can outperform it
when introducing the linguistic features in the proposed ap-
proach (“Our Approach + [43]”).
Method
PolitiFact BuzzFeed
Acc. F1 Acc. F1
Pe´rez-Rosas et al. [23] .811 .811 .755 .757
Zhou et al. [43] .865 .865 .855 .856
• BOWs .856 .858 .823 .823
• POS Tags .755 .755 .745 .745
• CFGs .877 .877 .778 .778
• DIAs .729 .735 .667 .647
• CBAs .604 .612 .638 .628
• RRs .621 .621 .658 .658
Word2Vec-based [19] .688 .667 .703 .718
Doc2Vec-based [14] .698 .698 .615 .615
Castillo et al. [3] .794 .822 .789 .794
Shu et al. [33] .878 .880 .864 .870
Our Approach .929 .932 .835 .842
Our Approach + [43] .933 .939 .865 .884
higher network view, which is a positive sign for our sum-
marized fake news patterns and defined representations of
patterns in networks. Fourth, network similarity features
can slightly improve the performance of the combination of
four fake news propagation patterns, which finally achieves
an accuracy and F1 score of around 93% (84%) on PolitiFact
(BuzzFeed).
4.2.3 Feature Importance Analysis
Features are ranked by their importance in fake news de-
tection. Results are shown in Table 6, which are obtained
by Relief algorithm, a widely-accept feature selection algo-
rithm [13]. Consistent with the performance of patterns, fea-
tures representing More-Spreader Pattern, Stronger-
Engagement Pattern, and Denser-Network Pattern
are relatively more discriminative in predicting fake news
compared to the other features. In addition, it can be ob-
served from Table 6 and Figure 7 that for More-Spreader
Pattern, features contributing most to fake news detec-
tion are the mean or median of (i) spreader susceptibility
and (ii) spreader influence, where fake news spreaders often
share a higher susceptibility and centrality score compared
to true news spreaders. For Stronger-Engagement Pat-
tern, such features relate to (iii) susceptible and normal
user engagements, where susceptible (normal) users engage
more strongly in fake (true) news compared to true (fake)
news. For Denser-Network Pattern, such features are
generally at (iv) ego and (v) community level. Specifically,
FNNs are characterized with a higher proportion of con-
nections between susceptible users (S → S) while TNNs are
characterized with a higher proportion of other ego relations
(S → N , N → S and N → N). With a same network size, a
4The results are based on Weisfeiler-Lehman graph ker-
nel [31]. As a widely-accept graph kernel, Weisfeiler-Lehman
graph kernel can measure the similarities among labeled
graphs, which we treat TNNs and FNNs as.
Table 5: Pattern Performance in Fake News Detection. More-Spreader Pattern and Stronger-Engagement Pattern
perform best compared to the others when being separately utilized to detect fake news. When combining different patterns,
their performance is in general better than when separately using them, and than when using network similarity, as a mix of
patterns from a higher view.
Pattern(s)
PolitiFact BuzzFeed
Accuracy F1 Score Accuracy F1 Score
More-Spreaders .891 .901 .808 .817
Farther-Distance .639 .587 .678 .698
Stronger-Engagement .898 .898 .807 .808
Denser-Networks .746 .718 .687 .704
More-Spreaders + Farther-Distance .846 .803 .824 .824
More-Spreaders + Stronger-Engagement .879 .864 .830 .847
More-Spreaders + Denser-Networks .919 .919 .770 .796
Farther-Distance + Stronger-Engagement .917 .923 .814 .824
Farther-Distance + Denser-Networks .742 .710 .786 .798
Stronger-Engagement + Denser-Networks .921 .926 .829 .840
All Patterns - Denser-Networks .908 .916 .814 .819
All Patterns - Stronger-Engagement .929 .928 .819 .815
All Patterns - Farther-Distance .913 .914 .780 .759
All Patterns - More-Spreaders .879 .871 .802 .803
All Patterns .929 .928 .828 .823
Network Similarity (Mix of Patterns)4 .808 .770 .671 .689
All Patterns + Network Similarity .929 .932 .835 .842
Figure 3: Impact of the Utilizing and Means to Calculate
User Susceptibility on Fake News Detection. Considering
user susceptibility can improve fake news prediction, while
two methods of computing user susceptibility perform sim-
ilarly.
FNN often has less communities compared to a TNN, which
indicate that a denser network structure is often within a
FNN compared to a TNN.
4.2.4 User Susceptibility Analysis
Two methods have been defined to compute user suscepti-
bility [to fake news] which plays an important role in repre-
senting patterns - one is based on the number of fake news
that a user has spread (Equation (1)) and the other is based
on the frequency of a user on spreading fake news (Equa-
tion (2)). Once such susceptibility is computed, whether
a user is susceptible or normal relies on the selection of a
threshold. Thus, here we assess the impact of user suscepti-
bility on fake news prediction by (I) how the susceptibility
(a) PolitiFact
(b) BuzzFeed
Figure 4: Impact of User Susceptibility Threshold on Fake
News Detection. When the threshold changes, (i) the perfor-
mance of Farther-Distance Pattern and network simi-
larity is hardly impacted due to no relevance to user sus-
ceptibility; (ii) More-Spreader Pattern or Stronger-
Engagement Pattern can outperform Denser-Network
Pattern though they are less stable; (iii) using all patterns
(with/without network similarity) can always perform com-
paratively well compared to the others and achieve the high-
est performance when the threshold value is 0.5.
Table 6: Top 20 Important Features
Rank PolitiFact BuzzFeed
1 Avg. Spreader susceptibility (#News) Median Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy)
2 Avg. Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy) Median Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy)
3 Median Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy) Avg. Spreader susceptibility (#News)
4 Median Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy) Avg. Spreader susceptibility (Frequncy)
5 Avg. Normal User Engagement (Frequency) Global Community Density
6 % Normal User Engagement (Frequency) Median Spreader Influence (Authority)
7 % Susceptible User Engagement (Frequency) % Normal User Engagement (#News)
8 % Normal User Engagement (#News) % Susceptible User Engagement (#News)
9 % Susceptible User Engagement (#News) Median Spreader Influence (In-degrees)
10 % Normal Spreaders (Frequency) % Normal User Engagement (Frequency)
11 % Susceptible Spreaders (Frequency) % Susceptible User Engagement (Frequency)
12 % Normal Spreaders (#News) % Normal Spreaders (#News)
13 % Susceptible Spreaders (#News) % Susceptible Spreaders (#News)
14 Global Community Density Median Spreader Influence (In-closeness)
15 % Egos (S → S, #News) % Egos (S → S, Frequency)
16 % Egos (S → S, Frequency) % Normal Spreaders (Frequency)
17 Avg. Normal User Engagement (#News) % Susceptible Spreaders (Frequency)
18 % Egos (S → N, Frequency) % Egos (S → S, #News)
19 % Egos (N → S, #News) Median Spreader Influence (Hub)
20 % Egos (N → S Frequency) % Triads (N → S, S → S, S → N, #News)
Blue: More-Spreader Pattern; Green: Stronger-Engagement Pattern; Yellow: Denser-
Network Pattern
is computed and (II) how the threshold is determined.
I. Computation of User Susceptibility. To evaluate the
impact of the [non-] existence of user susceptibility and how
it is computed, we conduct fake news detection (i) without
user susceptibility features, and by using features that com-
pute user susceptibility based on the (ii) number of news
spread, (iii) frequency of the spreading, and (iv) both num-
ber and frequency. The results are provided in Figure 3.
It can be observed that utilizing user susceptibility can en-
hance the performance by ∼10% when predicting fake news
based on both PolitiFact and BuzzFeed datasets. However,
no significant performance difference exists between the two
ways that user susceptibility can be calculated.
II. Evaluating User Susceptibility Threshold. To eval-
uate the impact of susceptibility threshold on fake news pre-
diction, we set the threshold value from 0 (i.e., all users
are susceptible) to 1 (i.e., all users are normal) and use the
proposed approach to predict fake news based on different
threshold values. The results are plotted in Figure 4. It can
be observed that when the threshold changes, (i) as the fea-
tures representing Farther-Distance Pattern and net-
work similarity do not need to compute susceptibility scores
of users, the performance is rarely impacted; (ii) More-
Spreader Pattern or Stronger-Engagement Pattern
can outperform Denser-Network Pattern while are less
stable; (iii) the combination of all patterns (with/without
network similarity) can always perform comparatively well
compared to the others and achieves the highest perfor-
mance when the threshold value is 0.5.
4.2.5 Impact of News Number and Distribution
As in the practice, the number and distribution (the propor-
tion between fake and true news) of news articles on social
networks can be dynamic and change, here we evaluate the
impact of the (i) number and (ii) distribution of news arti-
cles available on the performance of the proposed method.
To that end, a certain proportion (∈ [0, 1]) of samples is
randomly selected from the population of true news stories
in a dataset and that of fake news stories in that dataset, re-
spectively. The performance of the proposed approach with
each proportion of true and fake news is plotted in Figure 5
(the upper row). Results in Figure 5 indicate that, in gen-
eral, the proposed approach can perform an accuracy rate
of ∼0.7 to ∼0.85 and an F1 score of ∼0.65 to ∼0.9 in most
cases on both datasets.
Note that two variables (i.e., the number and distribution
of news articles) both exist and change in this process. For
a clear observation, we first control the sampled news dis-
tribution to be the same as that in original datasets, and
record the performance of the proposed method with var-
ious number of overall news articles available for training
and predicting fake news. On the other hand, we keep the
a fixed number of news articles while vary the proportion
between fake and true news in it.
Results are all provided in Figure 5 (the lower row). It can
be observed that (i) the impact of the number of news ar-
ticles is less significant compared to the news distribution
when predicting fake news based on the proposed method;
(ii) when varying the number of news articles, an accuracy
rate (we only present the accuracy performance in Figure
5 as the datasets are balanced at this time) between ∼0.73
(∼0.8) to ∼0.9 (∼0.82) can be achieved by using PolitiFact
(BuzzFeed) data and all patterns plus network similarity
(Stronger-Engagement Pattern); and (iii) when vary-
ing the news distribution, a F1 score (we evaluate the per-
formance only based on F1 score here as the datasets can be
unbalanced) ranging from ∼0.65 (∼0.75) to ∼0.93 (∼0.92)
can be achieved by using PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data and
all patterns plus network similarity (More-Spreader Pat-
tern).
(a) PolitiFact (b) BuzzFeed
Figure 5: Impact of News Number and Distribution on Fake News Prediction. In general, (i) the proposed approach can
achieve an accuracy rate (a F1 score) ∼0.7 (∼0.65) to ∼0.85 (∼0.9) in most cases on both datasets (see the upper four figures).
When only the number of news articles varies, an accuracy rate (here the datasets are class-balanced) between ∼0.73 (∼0.8)
to ∼0.9 (∼0.82) can be achieved on PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data and overall features (Stronger-Engagement Pattern).
When the news distribution varies, a F1 score (here the dataset can be unbalanced) ranging from ∼0.65 (∼0.75) to ∼0.93
(∼0.92) can be achieved on PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data and overall features (More-Spreader Pattern).
(a) PolitiFact
(b) BuzzFeed
Figure 6: Impact of Available Network Information on Fake
News Prediction. The proposed approach is generally stable
with an accuracy and F1 score between ∼0.8 (∼0.7) and
∼0.9 (∼0.82) on PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data.
4.2.6 Early Detection Analysis
Fake news early detection is an arduous but important task.
It aims to detect fake news at an early stage before it has
widely spread on social networks, when only limited infor-
mation is available. Early detection is crucial for fake news,
especially due to validity effect, which indicates that the
more individuals get exposed to certain fake news, the more
they may trust it. Meanwhile, it is difficult to correct one’s
cognition after fake news has gained their trust [26]. Effec-
tive early detection of fake news helps take early actions on
fake news intervention. As few temporal information (e.g.,
the time that users spread the news articles or form relation-
ships) is available in the datasets, the experiment to verify
the early detection ability of the proposed approach is de-
signed based on the following intuition. In our study, each
FNN or TNN provides all network information for the cor-
responding [fake or true] news story. If the dissemination of
a news story is at its early stages, the number of spreaders
(i.e., nodes) and the involved relationships among spreaders
(i.e., edges) should be relatively small compared to when it
has been widely spread. Hence, we randomly select a certain
proportion (∈ [0, 1]) of nodes or edges for each FNN or TNN
and detect fake news on these [sub-] FNNs and [sub-] TNNs.
The results are presented in Figure 6. It can be observed
from Figure 6 that the proposed approach is generally sta-
ble with an accuracy and F1 score between ∼0.8 (∼0.7) and
∼0.9 (∼0.82) by using PolitiFact (BuzzFeed) data, which is
friendly to fake news early detection.
5. CONCLUSION
With the rampancy of fake news and the damage it has
inflicted on societies, there is a demand for a deep under-
standing of fake news and effective approaches to detect it.
Integrating empirical studies and social psychological theo-
ries, our work can deepen the understanding of fake news by
investigating its patterns in social networks. These patterns
are further exploited and represented at multiple network
levels (i.e., node-, ego-, triad-, community- and network-
level) to detect fake news in an explainable way. Experi-
ments on two real-world datasets validate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach, which can perform relatively well
compared to the state-of-the-art. It should be pointed out
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Figure 7: Statistics of Illustrated Important Features for
Fake and True News
that compared to content-based models, the proposed ap-
proach can hardly detect fake news before it has been prop-
agated on social media, while it can detect fake news with
a stable performance by using limited amount of network
(propagation) information and a very small number of train-
ing news articles. Additionally, by rarely relying on news
content, it provides the other perspective to detect fake
news which is being robust to the possible manipulation
writing styles by malicious entities. Clearly, the proposed
approach can be enhanced by introducing more patterns and
user attributes that are defined using network information
such as network roles [9], and validated on cross-domain and
language fake news data to assess its generalization power.
Both will be part of our future work.
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